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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Within the literature investigating relationships among Corporate Social Performance 
(CSP), Corporate Reputation (CR), and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) (Orlitzky, 
Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Waddock & Graves, 1997), we identify two lines of inquiry. First, 
scholars have investigated the effect that CSP has on CR, “the overall estimation in which a 
particular company is held by its various constituents” (Fombrun, 1996: 36). Most maintain that 
CSP enhances CR (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Wang & Berens, 2014), with some exceptions 
(Walker & Dyck, 2014). Second, scholars concur that CR enhances CFP (Newburry, 2010; 
Roberts & Dowling, 2002). We argue that public trust in business (Harris, Moriarty, & Wicks, 
2014) plays an important moderating role in the CSP-CR-CFP relationship, as some have 
implicitly suggested (Barnett, 2007; Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2010). 
 Public trust in business, or more accurately public trust in the institution (North, 1990) of 
business, is “the level and type of vulnerability the public is willing to assume with regard to 
business relations” (Bolton et al., 2009: 6). Public trust in business has been declining since the 
1960s (Nye, Zelikow, & King, 1997) remaining at low levels since the 1990s (Wicks et al., 
2014). Although both managers (Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics, 2004) and 
academics (Wicks et al., 2014) agree that low levels of public trust can harm, inadequate 
research has investigated its effect on firms (Harris et al., 2014; Bolton et al., 2009).  We aim to 
partially rectify this deficiency. 
Here, we draw on signaling theory to investigate the role that public trust in business 
(Bolton et al., 2009) has in moderating the relationship among CSP, CR and CFP. We argue that 
levels of public trust towards business influence the CSP-CR-CFP relationship and develop 
hypotheses regarding this influence. Given that national context may systematically influence the 
CSP-CFP relationship (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006) and that public trust in business may vary 
cross-nationally (e.g. Chan, Lam, & Liu, 2011), we test our hypotheses on an unbalanced panel 
of 462 firms from 2006-12 from 9 countries (a total of 2534 observations). 
 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
CSP refers to a firm’s "configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of 
social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the 
firm’s societal relationships" (Wood, 1991: 693). The current business paradigm contends that 
CSP should generate benefits in the short term. To that end scholars have tested increasingly 
complex CSP models based on signaling theory (Spence, 1973, 2002) and the resource-based 
view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991; Boyd, Bergh, & Ketchen, 2010). 
Signaling theory has been applied in linking corporate policies and actions to stakeholder 
perceptions. CSP serves as a positive reputational signal to external stakeholders, who mostly 
operate under incomplete information (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). Given the information 
asymmetry that exists between different stakeholders and business firms (Stiglitz, 2000), and 
viewing the role of CSP from a signaling perspective (Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 2002), CSP 
can be seen as a signal through which firm managers try to communicate their firms’ underlying/ 
unobservable qualities to stakeholders. CSP signals information about organizational values, 
reliability and trustworthiness to stakeholders that reduces information asymmetry.  
 The second theoretical mechanism linking CSP-CR-CFP is RBV (Barney, 1991). 
According to RBV theorists, CR, an intangible resource that is valuable, rare and difficult to 
imitate, enhances CFP (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Gardberg and Fombrun (2006) 
argued that CSP and particularly corporate citizenship, creates intangible assets such as CR by 
making the focal firm more acceptable within a specific national context. Roberts and Dowling 
(2002) found that firms with good CRs are better able to sustain superior CFP over time. Thus 
we expect that CSP contributes to the creation of CR, which in turn enhances the firm’s CFP. 
Our expectation is consistent with Orlitzky et al. (2003), who in their meta-analysis of 52 
empirical studies over 30 years, found that CSP and CFP were positively correlated. 
Here, we propose a model of CSP, CR and CFP and argue that public trust moderates the 
mediation model's relationships. For CSP to reduce information asymmetry, stakeholders must 
perceive the signal as reliable, clear and credible. Extant research has found that prior reputation 
influences arbiters’ attribution of authenticity to firms’ corporate philanthropy (Bae & Cameron, 
2006; Lii & Lee, 2012). Arbiters judge the philanthropy of firms with weak reputations 
negatively while judging the philanthropy of firms with strong reputations positively. We 
contend that levels of trust at the societal level have a similar conditioning effect such that the 
credibility of CSP signals will vary across countries due to variation in the levels of trust in 
businesses across countries and institutional environments (Stevens, 2013).  
We first test if the CSP-CR-CFP relationship exists beyond the UK and the U.S., as the 
national institutional environment, in which CSP occurs, reputations are perceived and CFP is 
accrued, could affect signal transmission. Thus our baseline hypothesis explores this relationship 
among the general public across 9 clusters identified in the Project Globe study (House, Hanges, 
Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004) and Hofstede's framework (1980). Thus, we hypothesize: 
 
H1: CR partially mediates the relationship between CSP and CFP. 
 
The Moderating Role of Public Trust 
 
Because firms can transmit false signals via their CSP, stakeholders seek ways to classify 
signals' reliability (Connelly et al., 2011). Firms often signal a particular behavior (e.g. stock 
repurchases) but do not actually engage in it, a phenomenon known as ‘decoupling,’ that also 
could apply to CSP (Westphal & Zajac, 2001). Stakeholders, then, will have to develop ways to 
interpret the reliability of CSP signals, since their usefulness depends on whether they 
correspond to reality (Connelly et al., 2011). Moreover, uncertain receivers will seek guidance 
from others about how to interpret these signals (Branzei, et al., 2004; Sliwka, 2007). We argue 
that stakeholders draw on the prevailing public trust in business to interpret CSP signals.  
 Public trust in business stems from the cumulative experiences that individuals, 
comprising the public, in their different stakeholder roles, have had with specific firms (Harris & 
Wicks, 2014). We emphasize four points. First, trust in business differs from trust in specific 
firms with trust in (the institution of) business being the generalized view that individuals have 
induced from their experiences with specific firms over time (Harris & Wicks, 2014). Second, 
public trust refers to trust that individuals in their multiple stakeholder roles share. Third, 
different elements on which individuals can base their trust in firms exist. Harris and Wicks 
(2014) identified two elements: competence and goodwill; Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) 
found three: ability, benevolence and integrity; and Pirson and Malhotra (2008) found six: 
benevolence, integrity, managerial competence, technical competence and value congruence. 
Fourth, different stakeholders value these elements in distinct ways. 
We argue that stakeholders use public trust as a filter/heuristic to interpret CSP signals 
and decide if such signals are reliable and whether they should be influenced by them. Further, 
public trust in business can positively moderate the degree to which CSP contributes to CR for 
two reasons: (1) the effect public trust in business can have on the way individuals perceive and 
interpret the CSP of particular firms and (2) the history of events that led to the particular levels 
of public trust towards business. 
First, public trust in business influences how various stakeholders perceive and interpret 
firms' CSP and in turn the degree to which CSP adds to firms’ CR. Trust is essential if various 
stakeholders want to know about the firm’s CSP, given that they cannot always directly verify 
the firm’s CSP actions and often have to depend on the firm’s communications (Du et al., 2010; 
Illia et al., 2013). If stakeholders do not trust businesses, they will view with suspicion what a 
firm tries to signal through its CSP. Trust then can act as a heuristic when individuals are faced 
with social dilemmas (Kramer, 1999; Uzzi, 1997). Stakeholders will use their trust in business as 
a rule of thumb to decide if they should believe a firm’s CSP claims. 
Second, public trust in business does not happen in a historical vacuum. It results from 
positive or negative experiences that various stakeholders have had with firms. These histories 
that make it easier/harder, for firms to gain CR through their CSP. Janoff-Bulman (2010) argued 
that it is easier to destroy trust than to build it and Slovic (1993) found that negative events are 
more noticeable and influential than positive ones. These findings imply that corporate scandals 
can damage trust in business more than positive CSP actions of particular firms can repair it. 
Stevens (2013) observed that trust in business has declined in the U.S. due to very visible 
corporate scandals (i.e. Enron). Barnett (2007) argues that the stakeholder influencing capacity 
of firms depends to a great extent on the firm's history. We make a similar argument:  firms' 
ability to build CR via CSP depends not only on their own history, but also on their society's 
history of businesses. Hypothesis 2 follows: 
 
H2: The public’s trust in the institution of business positively moderates the positive 
effect that CSP has on CR. 
 
We also expect trust to shape firms' ability to use their CR for financial benefits. Scholars 
have found that CR contributes to CFP in many ways. Firms can use CR to attract talented 
employees (Windsor, 2006) or charge higher prices (Stigler, 1962). CR enhances CFP via its 
compensation for information asymmetries that various stakeholders face, as CR allows a firm to 
differentiate itself, by making stakeholders trust it, in spite of information asymmetries. For 
example, employees looking for a job, but unsure which firm would be a good fit, might use CR 
to assure themselves that the firm earned its good reputation in part because it is a good place to 
work. A key contributor to CR is the trustworthiness that different stakeholders attribute to a firm 
(Fombrun, Gardberg, & Sever, 2000; Gardberg & Fombrun, 2002).  
However, in countries with high trust in business most firms are considered trustworthy, 
which is not the case in countries with low trust in business. Therefore, firm trustworthiness 
should be rare in countries where the public’s trust in business is low and commonplace in 
countries where the public’s trust in business is high. By signaling credibility via their CR, firms in low trust countries will be signaling that they have something rare and valuable, whereas, firms in high trust countries cannot signal via their CR that they have something rare and valuable. In other words, we propose a masking effect. This will challenge firms 
with good CRs to differentiate themselves. Thus we suggest: 
 
H3a: The public’s trust in the institution of business negatively moderates the direct 
positive effect that CR has on CFP. 
 
H3b: The public’s trust in the institution of business negatively moderates the mediating 
positive effect that CR has on CFP. 
 
METHODS 
 
Data and Variables 
 
We collected firm data from the Reputation Institute (RI), Thomson Reuters ASSET4, 
and country data from Edelman Public Relations, the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators, and the Heritage Foundation for the years 2006 to 2012. This process resulted in a 
sample of 462 firms from 9 countries (firms per country in parenthesis): Brazil (92), China (65), 
France (73), Germany (82), India (32), Japan (49), Russia (47), Sweden (40), and USA (351). 
Dependent variable. We measure CFP by a firm’s return on assets (ROA) (Miller, 2004).  
 Corporate Social Performance. We operationalize CSP with two different measures from 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). We use the Social Pillar, 
which measures a firm's capacity to generate loyalty with its workforce, customers and society, 
via its use of best management practices and the Environmental Pillar, which gauges a firm's 
effect on living and non-living natural systems, including air, land and water, as well as complete 
ecosystems. 
 Corporate Reputation. We operationalize CR using the RI's RepTrak Pulse scores (Ponzi, 
Fombrun, & Gardberg, 2011). Firms were measured in their home country. The RI provided us 
with data from a representative sample of the public from nine countries described above, 
representing nine cultural clusters, consistently identified in the Project Globe study (House et 
al., 2004) and Hofstede's (1980) framework. 
Trust in Business. We operationalize trust in business in each firm's home country with 
the Edelman Trust Barometer (Stevens, 2013) which examines trust in business, government, the 
media and NGOs worldwide via survey of key influentials within countries. Edelman's sample of 
'informed publics' is skewed to higher income and higher education than the general public. 
 Control Variables. We also control for other factors both at the firm and country levels 
that may influence a firm’s CR or CFP. At the firm level we account for firm size with (the log 
of) number of employees, capital investments with capital expenditure to sales ratio, and slack 
with cash to sales ratio. At the country level, we use population size as a measure of market size 
(Alesina & Wacziarg, 1998), purchasing power with GDP per capita (Armstrong & Read, 2003), 
the ratio of internet subscribers to local population for the public’s accessibility to firm 
information, and the technological environment (Narula, 2012) with (the log of) the number of 
patent applications. We also account for the country's level of economic freedom with the Index 
of Economic Freedom (IEF) constructed by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal.  
The merger of the different datasets yielded an unbalanced panel of 462 firms from nine 
countries from 2006-2012. This is translated to a total of 2,534 observations across the seven 
years. The descriptive statistics of the merged data set are available from the authors.  
 
Statistical Analysis 
 
 We use hierarchical linear modeling methods because our observations are nested in three 
clusters: firms, industries and countries. We include random effects for country, industry, and 
firm levels as well as a random coefficient for ‘year’ at the firm level to account for multiple 
annual observations per firm. We test our hypotheses by juxtaposing estimated coefficients and 
comparing results of three different models (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Muller et al., 2005). We had 
multicollinearity from a high correlation between GDP per capita and IEF, and omitted IEF from 
the analysis. To reduce other sources of multicollinearity, we mean-centered all remaining 
independent variables before estimating our models (Muller et al, 2005). Variance inflation 
factors fell below the commonly accepted level of 10. Moreover, to enable causal inference, we 
lagged the main dependent variables one year. Results tables available from the authors.  
 
RESULTS 
 
In models 1 to 3, we test H1, which proposes that CR partially mediates the relationship 
between CSP and CFP. In Model 1, Social Pillar’s effect on ROA is positive and statistically 
significant (β = .001; p < 0.05). In Model 2, Social Pillar’s effect on CR is positive and 
statistically significant (β = .04; p < 0.01). In Model 3, CR’s effect on ROA is positive and 
statistically significant β = .003; p < 0.01) and the Social Pillar's effect on ROA is not 
statistically different to zero, as its absolute value is less than its value in Model 1. Jointly, the 
above results support the existence of the proposed mediation effect, supporting H1. 
 H2 proposes that trust in business positively moderates the positive impact that CSP has 
on CR. Model 2 shows that the interaction effect between the Social Pillar and Trust in Business 
is positive and statistically significant (β=0.001; p<0.01) suggesting that the positive effect of the 
firm’s Social Pillar on its CR is accentuated by higher Trust in Business in the country.  
 H3a (3b) proposed that the public’s trust in business negatively moderates the direct 
(mediating) positive impact that CR has on CFP. Following Muller et al. (2005), we find support 
for the moderation effect (H3a) and the moderated mediation (H3b). In Model 1, the effect of the 
Social Pillar on ROA is statistically significant (β=0.001; p<0.01), but not the effect of the 
interaction between Social Pillar and Trust in Business (β=-0.000; p>0.1). In Model 2, the Social 
Pillar has a statistically significant effect on CR (β=0.043; p<0.01). In Model 3, the interaction 
effect between CR and Trust in Business is statistically significant (β=-0.000; p<0.05) and 
negative, suggesting that the expected positive mediation effect of CR in the Social Pillar-ROA 
relationship is negatively moderated by Trust in Business. We find our theorized masking effect. 
 We repeated the analyses with Environmental Pillar. Counter to our expectations, 
Environmental Pillar lacked statistically significant relationships with CR and CFP. However, 
the interaction effect between the Environmental Pillar and Trust in Business is positive and 
statistically significant (p< 0.01) supporting H2.These two findings suggest that CR is affected 
by the joint effect of the Environmental Pillar and Trust in Business, not by either’s individual 
effect. Further, in Model 3, the effect of CR on CFP is positive and statistically significant 
(β=0.002; p<0.05) and the interaction effect between CR and Trust in Business is negative and 
(marginally) statistically significant (β=-0.000; p<0.10). On one hand our analysis does not 
substantiate the moderating role of trust in the Environmental Pillar-CR-CFP relationship. On the 
other hand, trust attenuates the direct positive effect of CR on CFP, supporting H3a.  
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 Herein, we developed and tested a multi-country, multi-level model of CSP, CR, CFP, 
and trust to examine confounding conditions in the CSP-CR-CFP relationship. Our findings have 
several implications for signaling and reputation theories as well as practice.  
 Theoretical Implications. Scholars have observed a consistent pattern of results in the 
relationships among CSP, CR and CFP in UK and U.S. contexts (Orlitzky et al., 2003). We 
extend this research across different signaling environments (e.g. Connelly, et al. 2011) to assess 
its applicability across eight other cultural clusters (Gupta, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002). Our 
analysis supports the mediating effect of CR on CSP and CFP and suggests that public trust in 
business acts as a signal filter (moderator) in the relationship. Firms’ ability to enhance their CR 
and capitalize on CSP varies based on trust in business.  
 We contribute to the study of trust by considering the effect of society's trust on CFP. We 
show that society's level of trust has a conditional effect on individual firms such that firms do 
not operate in institutional vacuums. Over time corporate actions and especially misconduct 
enact the level of trust in the environment that shapes future stakeholders' evaluation of CSP.  
 Practical Implications. Firms perform purposeful and inadvertent activities that affect 
stakeholders across national boundaries. We find that overall the Social Pillar has a positive 
effect on both CR and CFP with no evidence of a negative effect. Managers, then, may be 
frustrated because they cannot capitalize on the positive relationship in different countries. 
Consistent with prior research (e.g. Orltizky et al., 2003) the Environmental Pillar did not 
contribute at the same level. 
 Limitations. We used the RI's RepTrak Pulse dataset, a measure of CR among the public 
and were unable to compare the model across stakeholder groups (e.g. Wang & Berens, 2014). 
However, Orltizky et al. (2003) found that the CSP-CR-CFP relationship was stronger among 
financial stakeholders than public stakeholders. Thus, our model may be a conservative test.  
 Contribution. With few exceptions (e.g. Orlitzky, et al., 2003; Wang & Berens, 2014) 
there is insufficient comparative research across types of CSP and stakeholder groups. By 
including trust in our CSP-CR-CFP model, we extend study of the CSP-CFP relationship cross 
nationally. We suggest that public trust in business has both positive and negative effects, with 
implications for MNE managers with CSP portfolios across countries. Also, we find the duality 
of public trust in business an intriguing contribution to the debate on business and society. 
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